Paul Kerr used to work for the Arms Control Association. This is a personal blog; opinions expressed here are not those of anyone else.
INFCIRC/540 As Reference Guide
Scoblic-Mania
Osirak Foreshadowing: 1980 Iran Edition
Still More About Indian Uranium Enrichment
NYRB on ISIS, Parsi, and Iran
I was reading the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and thought I should point out that Annex II, titled “LIST OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR THE REPORTING OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 2.a.(ix)” is a pretty good reference guide for ENR technology.
That is all.
Hey Peter…
My first editor at ACT, Peter Scoblic, is leaving the SFSRC to become Foreign Policy’s new executive editor, according to Josh Rogin.
Congrats, man.
After I posted this short bit about the 1981 Israeli attack on Osriak, an astute reader reminded me of a topic that I meant to blog about: Iran’s attack on the same reactor the previous year.
The National Security Archives posted this October 1, 1980 edition of the National Intelligence Daily which confirmed the attack.
The post also contains a good account (AFAIK, it’s good – I don’t know anything about the history) of the whole issue, so take a look.
Following up on this post, I thought I’d point out that the 1981 State Dept report to which I have previously referred mentions that
[t]hus far, no “Nth” country (including India) has proceeded to the systematic separation of special nuclear materials.
Wow. The NYRB has an article (sub.req.) reviewing two pieces about Iran and I know everyone who’s written them. This won’t be repeated, I’m sure. One is this ISIS report and the other is Trita Parsi’s latest book.
Haven’t read the NYRB article yet…I’ll see how Mr. Coll did.
I get the feeling that this was meant in jest, but according to this 1974 memo of a meeting between US and Pakistani officials, Henry Kissinger had the following exchange with then-Prime Minster Zulfikar Ali Bhutto:
Bhutto:But don’t you come from New Delhi thinking that India is really expansionist?
Kissinger: After seeing India, I am thinking about supplying nuclear weapons, not only conventional arms, to Pakistan and even Bangladesh!
Likewise, I assume the below exchange between Kissinger and then-Paksitani Foreign Minster Aziz Ahmed (described in this 1975 MEMCON) wasn’t serious, but I don’t know enough about the history of the bilateral relationship to be certain:
Ahmed: We have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.
Kissinger: I hope the nuclear weapons are on the second list.
Ahmed: They are on the third list; we have the Pershing on the second list.
Kissinger: The Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any intention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time frame. The people who are pushing all this are the pro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to Israel. But you didn’t want it anyway.
Ahmed: No, only the nuclear weapons.
Kissinger: The 1960 models are in surplus now so we should be able to give you some —but I had better watch what I say since there is no telling what you might report back to Bhutto.
From the same National Security Archives trove, comes this April 1981 State Dept paper about nuclear proliferation.
There’s a lot there, but for now, I’ll highlight this passage about a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program:
Iraq is a current example of this process. It is an NPT party,
and we have no direct evidence that it intends to develop a nuclear
explosive option. However, the fact that it is acquiring (generally
safeguarded) sensitive technology and equipment in the absence of a nuclear power program, when taken with its petroleum reserves, which cast doubt on the need for nuclear power for development for the foresee- able future, and its radical political orientation, has begun the same kind of regional and international counter reaction that would be expected if its imminent intention to proliferate were established. As could be predicted, the reaction has been strongest from Israel – then state with the greatest political/security concern over an incipient Iraqi explosive capability, and secondarily from ourselves as guarantors of Israeli security. Long before Iraq is actually capable of a nuclear explosion we may have an Israeli counter action that poses grave regional problems.
That was quite an observation, given the events which occurred about 2 months after the report.
I could keep this up for a while.
Following on this post, I feel compelled to note a snippet another document from the National Security Archives trove that I mentioned before.
According to the June 1981 INR report,
[India] currently lacks sufficient enriched uranium for a larger weapons program.
That’s consistent with the 1979 document I wrote about, which states that India “produces weapons grade uranium.”
Carry on.
I mentioned it once before in this post, but Alex Wallerstein’s Restricted Data blog really is the dog’s danglers.
There’s all manner of great stuff, including the list of documents for download.
In the somewhat less-serious category, there are posts such as this one about USFG reminders to safeguard sensitive information. Specifically, it contains
a series of OPSEC videos the DOE Nevada Operations Office put together in what looks like the late 1980s or early 1990s, featuring the hapless character “Arnold OPSEC.” They are little film clips (non-animated) demonstrating poor, dumb Arnold OPSEC as he accidentally divulges classified information through clumsy practices.
This video of a guy with a mobile phone the size of a cinderblock is particularly silly.
A little while back, I was looking through this 1992 DoD report about the 1991 Gulf War and discovered this line on p. 150:
Intelligence estimates varied, but the planning assumption was that Iraq could produce a rudimentary nuclear weapon by the end of 1992, if not sooner.
